Preah Vihear: The Khmer Legacy

"Silence is not necessarily golden"

PREAH VIHEAR: Will it continue to be used as a patriotic tool for Thailand's politics? This report shows that the greed for power by Thai's politicians is the main culprit for the conflicts. Preah vihear is a Khmer legacy, if it is used properly it can be profitable for both Thailand and Cambodia; but it can be the source of the downfall for Thailand as we know it. How long will the Khmers who has lived under Thailand's rule for centuries contune to see their ancestor's legacy to be destroyed?

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Thailand's Rising Nationalism
Domestic political
By PAVIN CHACHAVALPONGPUN
The border skirmish between Thailand and Cambodia that started last Friday has claimed at least six lives and wounded many more. The fighting apparently started when Thai soldiers crossed into Cambodian territory in search of a dead comrade and came under fire. But the roots of the conflict lie in Thai domestic politics and the rise of nationalist groups that are fanning the flames of anti-Cambodian sentiment.

The border dispute has been running for decades, tracing back to at least 1962, when Thailand and Cambodia took the case to the International Court of Justice. The court ruled in Cambodia's favor, though Thailand has unsuccessfully challenged the verdict. Despite that history, the issue had been relatively quiet in recent years thanks in large part to Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen's amicable policy toward Thailand. That it's bubbling up again now has more to do with Thailand's internal politics than any nation-to-nation dispute per se.

The current crisis was sparked by seven Thai activists, including one parliamentarian from the ruling Democrat Party, who crossed illegally into the contested Cambodian-controlled territory on Dec. 29. Cambodian border guards arrested them, and they were locked up in a Phnom Penh jail. Three weeks later, a Cambodian court released five of them on suspended sentences and fined them one million riel ($250) each. The remaining two, still in detention, are charged with trespassing and espionage.

Thai nationalist groups such as the Thai Patriots Networks—a splinter group of the royalist yellow-shirt movement, the People's Alliance for Democracy—and the Santi Asoke Buddhist sect have seized upon the theme of "lost territories" to legitimize their nationalist hostility toward Cambodia. Some of the Thais who were arrested in December are members of the TPN; Veera Somkwamkid, one of the group's leaders, is one of the two who remain imprisoned across the border.

At a deeper level, however, the conflict reveals a power struggle between the government and the PAD, the two main bastions of royalism in domestic Thai politics. The PAD is apparently manipulating the border dispute between Thailand and Cambodia to undermine the Democrat-led government of Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva.

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Associated Press

In the shadow of a polarized Thai politics, fresh violence along the border.
Relations between the two groups were not always so fractious. The Democrat Party and the PAD fought side-by-side to unseat the government of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra and its subsequent proxies. They were both also willing to use anti-Cambodian nationalism as a rallying cry. This was clearest in the controversy over the Preah Vihear temple, a historic structure that lies in the disputed border region. When the administration of Thaksin successor Samak Sundaravej offered support to Cambodia's bid to list the temple as a Unesco World Heritage Site, Samak's PAD and Democrat opponents happily portrayed that stance as acquiescing to Cambodia's territorial claim.

Indeed, the Cambodia issue became an opportunity to further tar Mr. Thaksin, who was already dogged by allegations that his and his family's business dealings had clouded his government's judgment. Samak was accused by his political opponents of "selling out Thai sovereignty" to Cambodia to further the interests of the Thaksin family. The PAD condemned then Foreign Minister Noppadon Pattama, who previously served as Mr. Thaksin's legal advisor, for betraying his motherland and conspiring with Cambodia in "stealing" Thai territory. This was supposedly a quid pro quo for favorite treatment of Mr. Thaksin's businesses in Cambodia. Under extreme pressure, Mr. Noppadon was forced to resign.

But after it formed a government in late 2008 through a backroom deal brokered by the military, the Democrat Party gradually distanced itself from the PAD and its yellow-shirt protesters in an attempt to rebuild the government's image. PAD members were infuriated. Many believed that they helped install the Democrat Party in power but never got the credit they deserved from the Abhisit government.

So as Thailand nears a national election, possibly in the first half of 2011, the PAD hopes to use the latest row with Cambodia to return to the political limelight and strengthen its power base in Bangkok. It is organizing mass demonstrations near Government House and calling for Mr. Abhisit to adopt a tougher position on Cambodia's government, especially on the matter of the two remaining Thai prisoners. The PAD has also worked closely with the Santi Asoke Buddhist sect to challenge the Abhisit regime, vowing to continue protests until the prime minister resigns.

Cambodia may be the only resonant issue they have. Many of the PAD's other ideas are controversial—such as a proposal in which 30% of a future parliament would consist of elected leaders and the remaining seats would be reserved for appointees. Under this new political model, PAD leaders suggested, politicians would be required to exercise their powers responsibly, and with clear limits—an obvious anti-Thaksin measure. The proposal was severely criticized as a setback to Thai democracy.

Even beyond Mr. Abhisit's uncertain political future, though, the present moment is a pivotal one for Thailand. The end of King Bhumibol Adulyadej's reign of over six decades is nigh as the king's health is failing. The falling-out between the two royalist groups worries traditional elites who are keen to see consolidation, rather than disintegration, among different actors in this crucial period. A deepened fissure between the PAD and the Democrat Party would only make the old establishment increasingly vulnerable, opening the door for their opponents to gain an upper hand in Thailand's ongoing political stalemate.

At the same time, rumors are rife in Bangkok about an imminent coup. It is possible that the military will once again intervene to break the political deadlock if the crisis gets out of hand. Army chief Gen. Prayuth Chanocha has suggested that a coup is still an attractive option if the government proves unable to control the situation. If such whisperings are true, the Thai people will have to endure a new round of political conflict—and, more likely, a fresh round of violence.

Mr. Chachavalpongpun is a fellow at Singapore's Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.